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I. Introduction
I begin with the curious fact there is no tradition of thought, no established 
body of literature, that deals with the problem of harm in world politics, the 
problem of controlling the human capacity to cause violent or non-violent 
harm not only to other persons but to non-human species and to the natural 
environment. Discussions of the varieties of harm are scattered across different 
disciplines rather than integrated in such a way as to give the study of harm 
a more central place in the social sciences and humanities. Reflecting that 
condition, some have called for a new sub-field of inquiry; various labels for that 
area of investigation have been suggested: zemiology or zemiotics, the equally 
unloveable kakapoeics, and the more promising ‘social harm perspective’ 
which, by taking a broadly historical materialist approach to the criminal law 
within societies, is narrower than the perspective I have in mind. It might be 
thought that the diffuse analysis of harm is no bad thing, to which the following 
responses are offered. First, there is nothing more fundamental in social life 
than organising the capacity to harm (whether to defend society from enemies 
or to punish offenders) and controlling that capacity so that people are not free 
to injure, humiliate, exploit and in other ways harm others at will. Second, 
and more generally, human inventiveness in causing harm has been central to 
the success of the species, to its domination of many non-human species and 
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to its conquest of the planet. Third, that very ingenuity now poses a threat to 
human security and possibly to human survival. The evolution of the capacity to 
cause ever more destructive forms of harm to more and more people over ever 
greater distances is important here – as is the fairly recent realisation that the 
human impact on the physical environment may have reached the point where 
radical changes in social and political organisation and in personal conduct and 
orientations towards the world are now imperative (see Linklater, 2011). 
The remainder of this paper has four objectives. The first is to develop the 
earlier point about the fundamental importance of conventions for controlling 
the capacity to harm. The second is to clarify the nature of the contribution that 
process sociology can make to the study of harm. The third and fourth aims are 
to note how the English School analysis of international society can contribute 
to the development of a process-sociological analysis of harm in world politics. 
II. Harm Conventions
The fundamental importance of harm is evident from the plain fact that 
all humans are vulnerable, albeit to different degrees, to mental and physical 
harm, and from the reality that some people are only too willing to inflict harm 
on others. That is why all societies have harm conventions: conventions that 
distinguish between harmful and harmless conduct and which further distinguish 
between socially-acceptable and socially-prohibited forms of harm.  Systems 
of punishment explain my meaning since they distinguish between actions 
that people are free, and are not free, to commit, and because they differentiate 
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of pain or forms of suffering that 
can be inflicted to punish violations of social norms. Suffice it to add that harm 
conventions are interposed between the condition of vulnerability and the 
willingness of some people or groups to exploit susceptibility to mental and 
physical harm. 
Harm conventions govern relations between people in the same society, 
and they are formed in response to the injury that societies cause in their 
relations with each other. In the second domain, many harm conventions are 
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self-interested, as in the case of placing constraints on what the warrior can do. 
Societies usually issue a temporary license to kill, injure, and so on in order to 
guard against the dangers that returning warriors may pose to others in their 
community. Societies have often forbidden certain acts – such as the slaughter 
of prisoners of war – because each wants its prisoners back unharmed. Societies 
may also prohibit certain forms of harm for moral reasons – for example, 
because they believe that it simply wrong to cause unnecessary harm to civilians, 
or to torture enemies and so forth.
Perhaps moral or cosmopolitan reasons for limiting harm have not been 
the norm in human history. To make that point is to indicate that is possible to 
compare harm conventions in different international systems – and indeed to 
compare harm conventions at different points in the evolution of any particular 
states-system. It is possible to ask whether all international systems are more 
or less the same, whether the modern states-system is therefore no different 
from its predecessors, or whether there is evidence of progress in supporting, 
for example, cosmopolitan harm conventions (conventions that are designed 
to protect all people from certain forms of harm, irrespective of citizenship, 
nationality, race, gender, class, sexual identity and so forth). I should add that 
there is an ethical dimension to the sociological project I have in mind – one 
that is grounded in the belief that most people at most times and in most places 
have had an interest in avoiding mental and physical suffering. Most have not 
wanted to see their lives end prematurely, or to be left in chronic pain, or to be 
disfigured. That is one reason why certain laws of war have developed in most 
civilizations, and why societies may accomplish more by collaborating to reduce 
and eliminate unnecessary harm than by attempting to find some shared vision 
of the good society or the good life. 
It seems to be the case that modern societies have been unusually 
preoccupied with the problem of harm, as can be seen from practical measures 
to ground the criminal law in the liberal ‘harm principle,’ and from related 
theoretical inquiries into what it means to harm and be harmed, and from 
attempts to determine how many forms of harm exist in society. Various works 
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have provided an explanation of this preoccupation with harm. They include 
Charles Taylor’s, Sources of the Self, which emphasises the political influence 
of the Enlightenment notion of the ‘affirmation of everyday life,’ of the value 
of ordinary pursuits. Also significant is Rey’s The History of Pain which refers 
to ‘the secularisation of pain,’ that is the decline of the belief that suffering has 
sacred significance. The impact of those developments on modern societies 
is especially evident in John Stuart Mill’s defence of the harm principle in 
On Liberty where the argument is made that only harm to others should come 
within the province of the criminal law. In general, Mill argued, the state has no 
right to use the criminal law to promote a person’s own good. Because of the 
importance of the harm principle in liberal societies, it is hardly surprising that 
liberal theorists have been unusually preoccupied with analysing the concept of 
harm and with classifying harms.  (The key study is Joel Feinberg’s 4-volume 
study of harm and the limits of the criminal law). But to understand the liberal 
preoccupation with harm, it is useful to turn to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments which argued that, in modern societies, millions of strangers are 
thrown together; most do not feel much sympathy for each other, and they do 
not think it is reasonable to be asked to behave altruistically towards others, or 
to expect much altruism from others; they are, for the most part, preoccupied 
with their own interests; but they believe that relations between strangers should 
comply with principles of justice which, Smith argued, dictate that they should 
refrain from causing unnecessary harm. 
 
III. The Civilizing Process
Some of the themes that have been discussed resonate with the central 
argument of Elias’s The Civilizing Process – specifically with the argument about 
how lengthening webs of interconnectedness have led to changed sensitivities to 
violent and non-violent harm (for further discussion, see Linklater, 2010). The 
Civilizing Process was a study of how Europeans came to think of themselves as 
more civilized than their ancestors and the peoples around them; it is important 
to stress that it was not a defence of notions of European superiority. The 
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process of civilization was influenced by the following developments: the rise 
of stable monopolies of power, and with them the development of urbanised, 
marketised and monetarised economies that bound people more closely together. 
As a result of those changes, people experienced pressures to become better 
attuned to one another’s interests; powerful strata were pressed to modify their 
objectives lest they endangered the social order on which they depended. In 
significantly pacified societies, public displays of violence and evidence of 
cruelty aroused feelings of revulsion. Efforts to abolish certain forms of public 
violence – judicial torture or capital punishment, for example – or to move it 
behind the scenes, as in the case of the abbatoir – came to be regarded as central 
to the nature of a civilized existence.(1)  
To connect with the study of harm: in The Germans, Elias (1996, p.31) 
describes the civilizing process as one in which people go about ‘satisfying 
their most basic needs without killing, injuring and in other ways harming each 
other time and again’ (italics added). He argued in several places that levels 
of personal security are higher in modern societies than they were in many 
earlier periods, and that the threshold of repugnance towards violence is lower 
today than it was in those times. But in their relations with other societies, 
civilized societies behaved much as earlier societies had behaved – that is, 
with a singular devotion to the pursuit of self-interest and with little respect for 
civilized restraints. The fact that Elias made such observations at all is worthy 
of comment. Elias was critical of sociological approaches that analysed social 
and political change without considering the influence of relations between 
societies. As for the problem of harm, he strongly inclined towards the view – 
which is endorsed by realist and neo-realist theories of international relations – 
that little of substance changes in world politics. So much is evident from his 
claim that modern peoples are living much as their ancestors did in their so-
Elias did not regard those processes as inevitable or irreversible. He thought that decivilizing 
processes had gained the upper hand in Germany in the 1930s and later added that civilizing 
and decivilizing processes always develop in tandem – the question is where the initiative lies 
at any moment. The argument is developed in Elias (1996).
(1)
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called ‘barbarism’. Modern peoples may take pride in their civilized existence, 
but the paradox of their condition is that they live with the permanent danger of 
mass incineration in nuclear warfare. It was therefore hard to see how modern 
international relations differ from ‘primitive’ warfare in which people were 
ready to use poison against each other. True, ‘primitives’ were brought up with 
the expectation that they would torture their captives and would be tortured by 
them if they had the misfortune to fall into their hands. The male warrior found 
pleasure in warfare and in killing. The military in modern societies may not 
be required to cultivate joy in killing; they may be expected to observe at least 
something of the self-restraint that is demanded by those who perform civilian 
tasks in the larger social division of labour (Elias, 2000, p.170). The civilizing 
process has therefore suppressed some of the lust for killing that existed in 
past eras. But, in reality, all that has changed is the manner of killing, and the 
number of those involved. Elias argued in The Civilizing Process that modern 
states emerged from ‘elimination contests’ between the nobles; exactly the same 
process then governed their inter-relations. They too had to compete for power 
and security not because they necessarily wanted to extend their power as far 
as they could, but because they were forced to attempt to prevent adversaries 
from gaining control of strategically-vital territory. There is a parallel here 
with ‘defensive realism’ in international relations theory and with the notion of 
security dilemmas. There is a parallel too with the neo-realist conception of the 
‘self-help system’ that breeds levels of suspicion and distrust that frequently end 
in war – although it should be stressed that Elias (2000, postscript) was opposed 
to systems theorizing because it was ‘process reducing’ and ignored long-term 
changes in the ways in which peoples are bound together. Such competition and 
the resulting elimination contests, Elias argued, look set to continue until such 
time as the whole of humanity is brought under the dominion of a world state. 
Those comments suggest that there has been little, if any, progress in 
controlling harm in international politics. Elias argued in The Germans that 
societies have long subscribed to a double-standard of morality, observing one 
set of principles within their boundaries, and a more permissive code when it 
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comes to dealing with other societies. What was forbidden in relations between 
members of the same society has usually been permissible, and highly-valued, 
in relations with other groups. Elias qualified that observation in interesting 
ways, for example by arguing, again in The Germans, that modern people 
were shocked by the scale of the Nazi atrocities, whereas in antiquity the mass 
slaughter of people was often regarded as an inevitable aspect of warfare. It 
would, in any case, be counter-intuitive to suppose that the civilizing process did 
not spill over national frontiers and influence world politics. But the key point, 
for Elias, was that such civilized restraints invariably crumble rapidly when 
states fear for their security (the speed with which the Bush Administration set 
aside the ‘torture norm’ following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 illustrates the 
point). In short, states have always tried to promote their interests by any means 
at their disposal – unless they confronted external restraints and the ‘fear of 
retaliation.’ Only rarely have they decided that it might be in their long-term 
interest to comply with international principles. 
Elias did emphasise that the modern world is unique in that all people 
are being drawn into longer webs of interconnectedness. Lengthening social 
relations have ambiguous consequences as far as the control of harm is 
concerned. Some groups resent growing entanglements: they fear or resent 
threats and challenges to their power and prestige. The forces that are driving 
global integration give rise to counter-thrusts that are capable of gaining the 
upper hand. On the other hand, the pressures to become better attuned to the 
interests of people over greater distances have increased, as have pressures 
to display higher levels of self-restraint lest societies endanger the order on 
which they all depend, especially in the nuclear age. Mutual dependence creates 
incentives to think from the standpoint of others and to acquire detachment from 
parochial attachments. But the movement towards more detached standpoints 
(which would create the conditions that favour the development of cosmopolitan 
harm conventions) is not inevitable. Progress in thinking from the perspectives 
of others can be thwarted or reversed when people fear for their security, when 
they succumb to pressures to intensify feelings of identification with the relevant 
12 13
The Problem of Harm in World Politics
‘survival unit,’ and when they believe that observing inhibitions on harming 
adversaries is a danger they cannot afford.
IV. The English School and Process Sociology
Elias’s reflections on international relations raise many important questions 
that need further analysis. How far are relations between modern societies 
similar to the dominant patterns of interaction in earlier eras? To what extent 
has the modern society of stares been influenced by ‘civilized’ attitudes to 
violence, and how far is it therefore different from international relations in 
the ancient world or in Latin Christendom? Does the lengthening of the webs 
of interconnectedness create the possibility that the modern states-system will 
develop along new pathways marked by higher levels of self-restraint and 
foresight, and by higher levels of responsiveness to the interests of distant 
strangers? To answer those questions, it is essential to assess the influence of 
civilizing processes in different states-systems. 
The idea of a comparative sociology of states-systems which was advanced 
by Wight (1977) remains one of the most interesting features of the English 
School theory of international relations. Its importance for process sociology 
is evident from Elias’s comment that the system of states is the highest 
level of social integration that currently exists – the highest global ‘steering 
mechanism’ that societies have for the purpose of grappling with the challenges 
of interconnectedness. Elias’s interest in global political structures reflected his 
belief that people remain at the mercy of largely ungoverned processes, and that 
advances in creating ‘unions of states’ are essential if societies are to bring those 
forces under control. There is clear recognition that if there is to be a new phase 
in the civilizing process – a global civilizing process that curbs the power to 
cause violent and non-violent harm – then people will need to couple loyalties 
to traditional survival units with attachments to ‘supranational’ institutions. To 
date, the habitus (the general emotional dispositions that are evident in everyday 
life) has lagged behind advances in the level of human interconnectedness. 
Many people recognize the rationality of new forms of social and political 
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organization while admitting that they find little ‘emotional warmth’ in them. 
Various approaches to international relations have addressed such issues 
in their analyses of the prospects for international cooperation. They have 
investigated global civilizing processes in the technical sense of the term – 
which is not to say that they have been influenced by Elias’s writings, only that 
there are important parallels between those enterprises. One of the peculiarities 
of Elias’s approach is that it recognized the need to understand societies in their 
international setting while neglecting the literature on international relations that 
specialized in analyzing global civilizing processes. Perhaps the most obvious 
reason for that neglect is Elias’s tendency to deny that civilizing processes 
take root or develop very far in the absence of stable monopolies of power that 
provide security for people, and therefore free them from many of the dangers 
that arise when they are compelled to acquire weapons to protect themselves. 
There is an obvious contrast between that approach and the English School 
focus on ‘anarchical societies’ and its investigation of levels of civility and 
civilizing processes that impose some restraints on the capacity to harm even 
though there is no higher power monopoly that can enforce compliance with the 
relevant global harm conventions (Linklater, 2004). In short, on encountering 
Elias’s writings, members of the English School might wonder why there is so 
little on the rise and development of the European society of states and on its 
expansion to all parts of the world (see Bull & Watson, 1984). They might ask 
where the discussion of the civilizing role of diplomacy and international law is 
to be found. They might stress that Elias’s inquiry would profit from reflecting 
on the influence of the ‘standard of civilization’ on international society – the 
European convention that in the nineteenth century asserted the right to stand 
in judgment of non-European societies, to control their development, and to 
decide the changes that uncivilized societies had to undergo before they could 
be considered for membership of international society on equal terms with 
Europeans. Understanding more recent versions of the standard of civilization – 
including Western human rights standards and the idea of ‘market civilization’ – 
is no less important (Donnelly, 1998; Bowden & Seabrooke, 2006). 
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Members of the English School would be perfectly justified in thinking 
that process sociology can profit from analyzing those dimensions of world 
politics. But it is possible to reverse the argument by stating that the English 
School investigation of international society can benefit from understanding 
the European civilizing process, as explained by Elias. To rephrase the point, 
the study of international society can profit from understanding the larger 
transformation of human society that The Civilizing Process set out to explain. 
Alluding to the existence of something rather like a society of states, Elias 
observed that Europe’s court societies were bound together by notions of 
chivalrous or honourable conduct that gave the conduct of war some of the 
hallmarks of the aristocratic duel. Rather like Carr in Nationalism and After, 
and Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations, Elias maintained that ‘aristocratic 
internationalism’ declined with the rise of the national bourgeoisie (which 
failed, he added, to make world politics comply with universal and egalitarian 
principles). As that argument indicates, the aristocratic phase had not been 
influenced by commitments to promoting perpetual peace – although that is not 
to say that no civilizing process existed. Indeed the general argument invites a 
discussion of how the civilizing process influenced relations between states by 
incorporating them in what members of the English School describe as a society 
of states.
To develop the point further, it useful to turn to an author whose writings 
on manners were discussed in The Civilizing Process. The author is Francois 
de Callieres, a member of the court of Louis XIV and at one time ambassador 
to Spain, who published The Art of Diplomacy in 1716. Callieres’ treatise on 
diplomacy contains many insights into the relationship between court society, 
the civilizing role of diplomacy, and the international society of states. Of 
central importance was his contention that ambassadors should not be recruited 
from the higher nobility with its love of war, or from the military which was 
‘naturally violent and passionate’, but from court officials that belonged to 
the lower nobility (Callieres, 1983, pp.75, 86, 166ff).  Experienced in court 
rituals and etiquette, they were more likely to have the civilized qualities that 
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the ambassador needed, and they were less likely to behave in ‘a severe rugged 
manner’ that ‘commonly disgusts and causes aversion’ (Callieres, 1983, p.89). 
They could be relied on to possess a ‘civil and engaging carriage’, and to have 
an aptitude for civil conversation that would find favour and win influence in 
foreign courts (Callieres, 1983, pp.140, 143). Those obscervations established 
a crucial link between the civilizing character of court society and European 
diplomacy. They also provide support for Elias’s thesis that the French court 
was the model of civilized conduct that was emulated across much of Europe 
(see Keens-Soper & Schweitzer, 1983, p.23 on how the dominant conception of 
diplomatic conduct that was adopted across Europe reflected the standard-setting 
role of the French court). 
Callieres was adamant that the civilised qualities of court society were 
crucial in an era of increasing interconnectedness between societies. The lack of 
concern about harmful conduct that was evident in the tendency for the prince to 
act on the principle, sic volo, sic jubeo; stat pro ratione voluntuas – ‘let the fact 
that I wish this, be sufficient reason’ – was outmoded under conditions of mutual 
dependence (Callieres, 1983, p.62). New levels of restraint, greater sensitivity to 
the interests of others, and the willingness to compromise could bring ‘mutual 
advantages’.  The conviction that impulsive conduct should be replaced by the 
dispassionate quest for common interests was not based on political idealism but 
on an assessment of the challenges of interconnectedness. Change in one state, 
Callieres (1983, pp.68, 70, 97, 138) argued, was perfectly ‘capable of disturbing 
the quiet of all the others’ so that all had an interest in acting as members of 
‘one and the same Commonwealth’ that sought to cultivate a reputation for 
fair play and honesty (Callieres, 1983, pp.83, 110-11; also Keens-Soper & 
Schweizer, 1983, p.36).  Callieres’ claims are therefore cast in the language of 
international society. No higher authority could direct states in the system that 
had replaced the respublica Christiana. Even so, the constituent units were ‘parts 
of a civilization’ that could promote ‘order and adjustment by civilized means’ 
(Keens-Soper & Schweizer, 1983, p.35, italics added). Civilized diplomacy in 
the late eighteenth century was the creation of court society (Keens-Soper & 
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Schweizer, 1983, pp.29-31). 
V. The Global Civilizing Process and the Standard of Civilization 
Every discourse of civilization, Walter Benjamin argued, is also a discourse 
of barbarism. Illustrating the point, Europeans contrasted their civilization with 
the world of the ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian.’ From the time of Columbus, the idea 
of civilization was used to justify force, the appropriation of the land, and the 
enslavement or displacement of ‘backward’ peoples. Elias observed in The 
Germans that Napoleon announced that the French had a civilizing mission, 
a responsibility to export civilization to conquered territories. Such attitudes 
were embedded in international society in the nineteenth century, as the idea of 
‘the standard of civilization’ reveals (Gong, 1984; Suzuki, 2009). The idea of 
extra-territoriality which was designed to ensure that non-European societies 
would treat Europeans in a ‘civilized’ way shows how the society of states stood 
between the civilizing process and the overall transformation of human society. 
Pressures to conform to European rules led the Ottomans, China and Japan to 
import Western practices, including the institution of diplomacy. It is important 
to stress that the European powers were not a little appalled by non-European 
societies that assumed they were superior to them (Bull & Watson, 1984). The 
expansion of international society as influenced by the European standard of 
civilization transformed human society by eroding hegemonic conceptions of 
world order in China and elsewhere (while preserving the European’s sense of 
their cultural and racial superiority which was enshrined in their belief that the 
society of states was one of the hallmarks of their civilization). 
The idea of civilization has always had highly ambiguous consequences for 
how Europeans understood their rights and duties to the wider world. They were 
evident in the first contacts between European and non-European peoples in the 
Americas when opinion divided between those who thought that civilization 
gave the colonial authorities unlimited – or virtually unlimited – rights over the 
newly-conquered peoples, and those who believed that Christendom formed part 
of a larger human society, and that non-Christians had rights against Christians – 
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rights to be spared physical cruelty if not colonial efforts to bring about religious 
conversion. From those examples, one can see how the idea of civilization was 
used by some groups to claim that almost anything was permitted in relations 
with ‘barbarians,’ and harnessed by others to protest against imperial cruelties, or 
to argue that the suffering that was caused by the Atlantic slave trade and slavery 
should be forbidden, and also to support forms of international trusteeship that 
had the purpose of preparing the colonies for eventual self-government, albeit 
in imitation of the dominant Western powers (Bain, 2003; Crawford, 2001). We 
have evidence here of how the civilizing process influenced European attitudes 
and behaviour towards the rest of the world, how it was linked at certain times 
with efforts to promote sympathy for non-European powers in accordance with 
civilized sensitivities to violent and non-violent harm, and how it influenced the 
belief that the European society of states had obligations to other peoples which, 
for some, came to include the duty to ‘prepare’ them for eventual membership of 
the society of states  (Crawford, 2001).
Despite its use in opposition to violent harm, enslavement, humiliation and 
so forth, the idea of civilization underpinned what Elias (2000, p.386) called the 
‘most recent phase’ of the civilizing process in which the global establishment 
– the European colonial powers – attempted to persuade the outsiders – the 
colonised peoples – of their cultural inferiority and need to emulate the customs 
of the imperial overlords. As Bull (1984) argued in his comments on ‘the revolt 
against the West,’ non-European peoples rejected such Western assumptions 
which do not have much support in the West now that imperialism has been 
delegitimated. The upshot has been a general shift away from the conviction that 
the world is divided between the ‘civilized’ world and the outlying ‘barbarian’ 
regions to the belief that the world consists of numerous civilizations which 
exist on an equal plane, none more important than the others. Indeed, it might be 
argued that that ‘the most recent phase’ of the civilizing process is to be found 
in the idea that civilisation is not monopolised by any one people but exists in 
multiple forms that warrant equal respect. Or, the most recent phase is found 
in the uneasy compromise between that view and the belief that all peoples 
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possess universal human rights that should not be subordinated to the claims of 
culture, civilization and tradition. In any case, international relations no longer 
revolve around the question of how the civilized world should behave towards 
the uncivilized world, but involve questions about how different cultures 
(or civilizing processes) can co-exist as equals within the framework of the 
international society of states.
The political challenges are immense not because of any impending 
‘clash of civilizations’ but because many cultures and civilizations have yet 
to shed assumptions about their superiority to outsiders, however that might 
be expressed. As Elias (2008) argued, most societies in human history seem 
to have felt the need to place themselves above others, and to find collective 
satisfaction in the belief that others are inferior to them. Such characteristics 
were fundamental features of the European civilizing process from the attempts 
by the early courtiers to distinguish themselves from members of the ‘repugnant’ 
lower strata, through the larger process of state-formation and ‘internal 
colonialism,’ to contemporary Western ideas about exporting free market 
liberalism and liberal democracy. Because of the nature of their civilizing 
processes, many other societies face similar challenges in acquiring detachment 
from parochial belief-systems, in understanding the world from the standpoint 
of others, and in appreciating how they are perceived by those who exist in the 
more distant areas of the web that binds different peoples together. Elias (2000, 
p.410) argued that if societies are to succeed in living together amicably in the 
context of rising levels of global interconnectedness, they will need to rise to the 
foreign policy challenge of devising suitable principles of co-existence between 
peoples who have been gone through very different civilizing processes and who 
have different conceptions of the level of self-restraint that is essential in their 
relations with other peoples.
From that vantage-point, the question is whether they can agree on similar 
standards of self-restraint – whether they can find common ground in harm 
conventions that rein in the capacity to damage the interests of others. Some 
have argued that there has been already been substantial progress in reaching 
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an agreement about ideas of civility – in global harm conventions – that span 
very different cultures. In The Global Covenant, Robert Jackson maintains that 
international society is the most successful form of world political organization 
to date in establishing principles that enable separate political communities to 
co-exist relatively amicably (it is worth adding that Jackson uses the concept of 
‘civility’; to describe that state of affairs; he regards it as preferable to the idea 
of civilization with its connotations of superiority over peoples; but it conveys 
many of the ideas that have been associated with a civilized way of life such 
as restraints on violent harm and compliance with the rule of law). Elias was 
rather less confident that societies have found ways of bridging their different 
conceptions of civilized conduct. In the course of being forced together, he 
maintained, people face new pressures to learn how to be better attuned to the 
needs and interests of other people over greater distances. But as noted earlier 
those are only pressures; they do not guarantee that societies will agree on the 
nature of the global civilizing process – on the harm conventions – that should 
bind them altogether. Indeed, the more people are pushed together by processes 
they do not understand and do not control – and the more they believe they 
are tied to others in relations that diminish their power, autonomy and prestige 
and promote significant advantages for others – the more likely they are to 
react against them, quite possibly by using force. Examples include the violent 
reactions to the encroachment of European power in many non-European 
societies in the age of imperialism and the contemporary revolt against the 
West that is evident in radical Islam. From Elias’s perspective, the tensions 
between the forces of integration and disintegration seem likely to continue. 
Global civilizing offenses that seek to promote restraint in the acquisition of 
the most destructive forms of violence, or respect for human rights, may clash 
with counter-thrusts that reject such efforts to place such global restraints 
on sovereign power. ‘The civilization of which I speak,’ Elias (1996, p.31) 
maintained, is far from complete, and may never be completed. The same point 
applies to a global civilizing process in which the international society of states 
supports efforts on the part of groups to live together with the minimum of 
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violent and non-violent harm.
VI. Conclusion
Martin Wight maintained that all states-systems have developed within 
a common civilization that was aware of its differences from the rest of the 
world – the less ‘civilized’ world which authorized acts against ‘barbarian’ 
outsiders that were forbidden in relations between ‘civilized’ peoples. Where 
did that common civilization come from? What was its source? In Court 
Society, Elias maintained that court societies have had a crucial role in the 
development of civilizing processes. It is unclear whether or not the speculation 
sheds light on long-term patterns of development in different civilizations. But 
there is good reason to think that the European courts were instrumental not 
only in the formation of civilized restraints on conduct within society but also 
on conceptions of civilized statecraft in international society, and on a more 
relaxed conception of what was permissible in relations with the civilization. 
It is important to ask how far a comparative investigation of court societies 
can explain conceptions of international society, associated ‘standards of 
civilization,’ tensions between the arrogant and self-critical (or inclusionary 
and exclusionary) dimensions of civilizing processes, and potentials to support 
global civilizing processes that imposed collective restraints on the capacity to 
cause violent and non-violent harm.
The analysis of the civilizing role of court societies (whether European or 
non-European) is one possible route to higher levels of synthesis in the social 
sciences. With respect to the modern era, Elias’s discussion of court society and 
civilization paid little attention to the formation of the society of states, whereas 
English School reflections on the evolution of that particular form of world 
political organization have mainly ignored its relationship with the larger process 
of social and political change that Elias examined. The result is that there has 
been little research on how the development of the society of states is part of the 
larger transformation of human society – more specifically, how the standard of 
civilization underpinned what were often successful efforts to transform outlying 
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societies, how that conception of civilization led to tensions over rights and 
duties to the less civilized world, and how different societies have been left with 
the question of how to organize their international relations so that they do not 
cause one another unnecessary violent and non-violent harm. Some fundamental 
questions suggest themselves. How far are different civilizing processes in the 
modern world converging on similar social standards of self-restraint? To what 
extent are they reaching an agreement that things that were once permitted are 
now forbidden?(2) How far are changes occurring in the organization of social 
and political life and in the individual habitus in response to revolutionary 
developments in the capacity to cause higher levels of violent and non-violent 
harm to more and more people over greater distances? How far are modern 
societies poised to undergo a civilizing process and to create demanding 
harm conventions that address the problem of harm in world politics? Closer 
links between English School approaches to international society and process 
sociology are essential to answer such questions.
(2) The reference is to Caxton’s saying in the early fifteenth century that things once permitted are 
now being forbidden, and to Elias’s observation that  the comment might stand as the ‘motto’ 
for the whole civilizing process that was to come (Elias, 2000, p.104).  
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<Summary>
Andrew Linklater
This paper argues that there is nothing more fundamental in social life 
than organising the capacity to harm (whether to defend society from enemies 
or to punish offenders) and nothing more fundamental than controlling that 
power so that people are not free to injure, humiliate, exploit and in other ways 
harm others at will. No tradition of thought has analysed the problem of harm 
directly; however the sociological perspective that was developed by Norbert 
Elias provides unusual insight into how modern societies have reduced the 
dangers of physical violence. A weakness in Elias’s position is the conviction 
that there is no equivalent to the civilizing process in the relations between states 
– a standpoint that is plainly contradicted by the English School analysis of 
international society. The English School has not explored connections between 
the development of modern international society and the civilizing process. It 
is therefore important to combine elements of the English School and Eliasian 
sociology to understand long-term patterns of change within and between 
modern societies, and specifically to consider how far there have been advances 
in reducing violent and non-violent harm in international relations.
